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Emerging markets do not handle adverse shocks well. In
this paper, we lay out an argument about why emerging
markets are so fragile, and why they may adopt contractual
mechanisms—such as a dollarized banking system—that in-
crease their fragility. We draw on this analysis to explain why
dollarized economies may be prone to dollar shortages and twin
crises. The model of crises described here diﬀers in some im-
portant aspects from what are now termed the ﬁrst-, second-,
and third-generation models of crises. We then examine how
domestic policies, especially monetary policy, can mitigate the
adverse eﬀects of these crises. Finally, we consider the role, po-
tentially constructive, that international ﬁnancial institutions
may undertake both in helping to prevent the crises and in
helping to resolve them.
JEL Codes: E5, F3, G2.
There is a strong correlation between the stoppages of capital
ﬂows to a country, the extent of dollarization of the country’s bank-
ing system, and the prevalence of banking crises. Between 1974 and
2003, 56 percent of all episodes where capital ﬂows underwent a
“sudden stop” ended in a banking crisis; the same proportion rises
to 75 percent in those episodes where the country also had a high
level of dollarization, and to 100 percent if, in addition to a high
level of dollarization, the country had in place a ﬁxed exchange rate
(see Inter-American Development Bank 2005). What accounts for
these correlations? Are there domestic policies that can mitigate
such risks? How can international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs) help
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177
178 International Journal of Central Banking September 2005
their member countries avoid or diminish the consequences of such
a predicament? We address these questions in this paper.
We review, ﬁrst, why emerging markets may adopt contractual
mechanisms—such as a dollarized banking system—that accentuate
rather than lessen their vulnerabilities. We argue that weak institu-
tions in emerging markets tend to make it harder for the emerging
markets to cope properly with economic adversity. The burden of
downturns, instead of being shared in predictable ways, is spread
in a haphazard manner through, for example, selective defaults and
high inﬂation. In such an environment, and with limited contract
enforcement, the best protection for investors against risks may well
be a domestic deposit denominated in foreign currency (following
the convention in this literature, we will call the foreign currency
“dollars”).
Having enough dollars at all times is critical to the functioning
of a dollarized banking system. We argue that an incipient dollar
shortage, brought about by excessive government borrowing, or an
external “liquidity” shock, or an overvalued exchange rate, can be
magniﬁed by a dollarized banking system into a total collapse of
the ﬁnancial system, the exchange rate, and other asset prices. Our
explanation of crisis diﬀers in some important aspects from what are
now termed the ﬁrst-, second-, and third-generation models of crises.
The links between the government and the banking system can
come about simply because both dip into a common pool of dollars.
Diﬃculties for one may create diﬃculties for the other even if the
banking system does not hold signiﬁcant amounts of government
debt or the government does not bear the contingent liabilities of
the banking system. Similarly, the collapse in the exchange rate and
the collapse in the banking system can occur close together, not just
because the corporate or banking system’s liabilities explode in value
after depreciation, but also because the depreciation is a result of the
banking system’s desperation for dollars. While dollar shortages can
cause banking system crises, the reverse is also possible. By no means
do we imply that any of the other channels already identiﬁed in the
literature are unimportant (see Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo
[2001a] or Aghion, Bachetta, and Banerjee [2001] for models that
emphasize these other channels). Rather, we focus on one particular
channel, the banking system’s need for dollar liquidity, which can tie
many of these eﬀects together.
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Then, we explore various possible policy interventions to mitigate
the eﬀects of dollar shortages, including whether the multilateral ﬁ-
nancial institutions have a role to play. If dollarization arises primar-
ily from institutional inﬁrmities rather than a distorted incentive to
take on risk, it may be costly to legislate it away. Countries may
have to learn to live with dollarization for awhile. At the same time,
if poor institutions rather than poor incentives are to blame, inter-
ventions to mitigate the eﬀects of dollarization need not exacerbate
typical sources of moral hazard.
In the rest of the paper, we lay out ﬁrst the basic argument and
provide evidence for some of its assumptions. We then examine vari-
ous interventions domestic authorities could undertake, and end with
a discussion of possible interventions by the multilateral institutions.
1. A Framework
1.1 Why Are Emerging Markets Diﬀerent?
A growing number of economists identify the quality of institutions
as producing important diﬀerences between emerging markets and
developed economies. Broadly speaking, economic institutions may
be basic or narrow. By basic, we mean fundamental institutions,
such as those that ensure the security of property, including through
the prevention of arbitrary taxation, or those that help enforce con-
tracts. Basic institutions create the broad enabling environment for
transactions between private agents and the state, and between pri-
vate agents themselves. By narrow, we mean more detailed features
of the institutional environment, such as whether the central bank is
de-facto independent or whether there is a functioning bankruptcy
code. Although not without exceptions, a country with weak basic
institutions also ﬁnds it diﬃcult to build eﬀective narrow institu-
tions.
One important role played by basic institutions is to mediate
the process and outcome of social conﬂicts, particularly in times of
adversity. Typically, in a growing economy, diﬀerences between social
actors may be papered over. A downturn, though, usually brings out
or sharpens latent social tensions.
Why growth seems to be easier to share than adversity is no
trivial question. If consumption is shaped by habit, an income loss
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is much harder to swallow, while satisfaction from additional gains
is less important to ﬁght for. Individual aversion to losses in wealth
is well documented in behavioral science. On the other hand, con-
ﬂict may dissipate growth opportunities more easily than it may
worsen an already stagnant situation. For example, squabbling be-
tween workers and management may drive investors away, chasing
away the chance to start new projects; however, if there are no new
investment opportunities on the horizon, squabbling is less costly, as
the existing plant and machinery is already a sunk investment.
Regardless of why conﬂicts are greater in times of economic ad-
versity, how a society deals with such conﬂicts depends on the kind
of conﬂict management institutions it has. In a comprehensive study
of failed states, Collier et al. (2003) ﬁnd that years of poor economic
growth precede civil war. Even after concluding a peace, the proba-
bility of these states lapsing back into war is high. Not surprisingly,
these states typically have weak conﬂict management institutions,
such as patchy law enforcement, limited adherence to democratic
principles, and few meaningful checks and balances on the govern-
ment. Similarly, Rodrik (1999) ﬁnds that the countries that expe-
rienced the sharpest drops in growth after 1975 were those with
divided societies and weak conﬂict management institutions (as prox-
ied for by indicators of the quality of government institutions, rule
of law, democratic rights, and social safety nets).
Acemoglu et al. (2003) ﬁnd that countries with poor institu-
tions have the highest volatility of growth and higher levels of in-
ﬂation than countries with well-functioning institutions. Satyanath
and Subramanian (2004) show that over and above the eﬀect of poli-
cies, the quality of political institutions aﬀects the extent of nominal
macroeconomic instability in a country.
Societies with well-functioning institutions allocate burden shar-
ing in times of distress in predictable ways. For example, those who
suﬀer the most adversity can fall back on an explicit social safety
net—a minimum level of unemployment insurance. Debtors and cred-
itors can appeal to bankruptcy proceedings to determine their rel-
ative shares. With an explicit and contingent institutional sharing
mechanism dictating the division of pain in place, there is no need
to take to the streets, the backrooms, or to the money printing press
to settle outcomes.
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By contrast, when institutions are too weak to oﬀer predictable
and acceptable settlements, or protect existing shares, everyone has
an incentive to jockey for a greater share of the pie. Outcomes will
be mediated more by the relative bargaining power of actors than
by preexisting implicit or explicit contracts.
Often, bargaining will break down. Then, a government without
the institutional capacity to allocate the burdens of adversity among
its citizenry fairly will be tempted to spread it through the easi-
est means available—inﬂation. Nominal instability will accompany
real instability in countries with weak institutions, lending support
to the view that while the proximate cause for inﬂation may be
monetary expansion, inﬂation is always and everywhere a political
phenomenon!
1.2 Evidence for the Link Between Inﬂation and Poor Growth
We want to establish two facts here, which are a little diﬀerent from
the work cited so far. First, we want to test whether the inﬂation
“tax” is higher in downturns, and second, whether this phenomenon
is particularly acute for countries with poor institutions. To check
this, we have data on the value of the inﬂation tax, which is meas-
ured as ∆CPI /(1 + ∆CPI), where ∆CPI is the change in the con-
sumer price index in the country over the year. This is computed
every year from 1965 through 2002 for 165 countries. In table 1, we
present summary statistics and cross-correlations for the inﬂation
tax, the standard deviation of the inﬂation tax computed over the
preceding ﬁve years, the growth rate in GDP, and the quality of insti-
tutions measured by four diﬀerent indices: government eﬃciency, rule
of law, quality of regulation, and control of corruption. These indices
are from the Governance Matters III database (see Kaufman, Kraay,
and Mastruzzi 2004). We also report an index of institutional qual-
ity constructed using the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
indicators; this second institutional index approximates the one used
by Knack and Keefer (1995).
In ﬁgure 1 (shown on page 184), we plot the real growth of a
country’s GDP, averaged over 1980 to 1995, against average inﬂation
tax over the same period. This is plotted separately for countries with
below-median levels of government eﬀectiveness and for countries
with above-median levels. The negative slope is steeper in the former,
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suggesting that slower growth is correlated with more inﬂation in
countries with weak institutions.
Rather than average correlations, we are interested in the time-
series patterns across countries. In table 2 we use a panel of yearly
observations from 1965 through 2002 where the dependent variable
is the inﬂation tax in a year in a country. In column 1, we estimate
a random eﬀects GLS (generalized least squares) model where the
explanatory variables are a constant and the growth rate in GDP.
The coeﬃcient of the GDP growth rate is negative and highly sig-
niﬁcant, suggesting that the inﬂation tax is highest in periods of
low GDP growth. A standard deviation increase in the growth rate
is associated with a reduction in the inﬂation tax by .0241, which
is 20 percent of its sample standard deviation. In column 2, we in-
clude the index of government eﬃciency (the results with the other
“Governance Matters” institutional variables are qualitatively simi-
lar) and the interaction of GDP growth with the index. As the prior
literature has found, countries with a better institutional environ-
ment tend to experience lower inﬂation tax. Particularly interesting
is that the positive signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the interaction term sug-
gests, as predicted, that the inﬂation tax in countries with better
institutions is less sensitive to growth. In column 3, we estimate the
model including country ﬁxed eﬀects, and ﬁnd no qualitative change
in the coeﬃcients of interest.1
One problem with the estimated model is that we cannot tell the
direction of causality. High inﬂation may, in fact, cause low growth,
though why this should be more pronounced in countries with poor
institutions is harder to say. Nevertheless, it is important to examine
the eﬀect of the exogenous component of growth on the inﬂation tax.
Typically, a country will be aﬀected by similar exogenous shocks
as its neighbors—if not directly, then via trade. So one plausible
instrument for a country i’s growth is EXTGROWTH, which is the
weighted average growth of all other countries j, with each country
j’s growth weighted by that country’s log GDP and divided by the
square of the distance between i and j. In column 4, we reestimate the
ﬁxed-eﬀects model, using EXTGROWTH to instrument for growth.
1We also cluster by country and include year indicators with no qualitative
change in the interaction coeﬃcient.
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The coeﬃcient of the interaction is now larger in magnitude and
stronger in signiﬁcance.
Large countries may aﬀect the growth of their neighbors, so there
is a case for arguing the instrument is purer for small countries. One
should ask if the coeﬃcient estimate for the interaction diﬀers for
small countries. In column 5, we reestimate the ﬁxed-eﬀect instru-
mented regression with an additional term, the interaction multiplied
by an indicator for countries whose GDP is below the ninetieth per-
centile GDP. The coeﬃcient estimate for the indicator is statistically
insigniﬁcant and small, suggesting that small countries do not have a
diﬀerent estimated interaction coeﬃcient than large countries. This
lends conﬁdence to the instrument for growth.
There could, however, be some concern about our measure for
institutional quality. It may be that the proxy for institutions is
simply a proxy for per capita GDP. In column 6, we also include the
interaction between initial GDP for the country (in 1965 or the ﬁrst
year for which we have GDP) and the country’s growth rate. The
coeﬃcient of the interaction between institutions and growth is now
slightly higher in magnitude, and still strongly signiﬁcant.
We have assumed that institutions are slow moving, and have
thus taken the index of government eﬃciency from Kaufman, Kraay,
and Mastruzzi (2004)—averaged over the years 1996, 1998, and
2000—as the measure of institutional quality in a country for the
period 1965–2002. One concern is that this measure is not predeter-
mined and exogenous. There is some controversy about what instru-
ments are appropriate for institutions. Following Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson (2002), we use the log of a country’s population density
in 1500 (countries that had less of a native population were less likely
to have an exploitative colonial structure imposed on them and have
better institutions today) as an instrument for institutional quality
in column 7. While we lose a number of countries, the coeﬃcient of
the interaction is still positive, large, and statistically signiﬁcant.2
The opposite concern would be that the measure of institutional
quality is too static, that it does not reﬂect changes that take place
in a country over time. The problem is that detailed measures of
2Of course, while the instrument for institutional quality is exogenous and
predetermined, whether it satisﬁes exclusion restrictions depends on what else
we think might explain the institutions-growth interaction. Since we have put
forward no such alternative explanation, we do not pursue this issue.
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institutional quality going back to 1965 are simply not available.
However, the index we have constructed from ICRG data is one
measure of institutional quality that does go back to 1985.3 In col-
umn 8, we use the data from 1985, with the time-varying index as
our measure of institutional quality, and ﬁnd that the interaction
variable is positive and signiﬁcant as predicted.
The bottom line is that the inﬂation tax is higher when countries
experience poor growth (as also in Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh
2005), and it is particularly high when those countries have poor
institutions. Poor societies with weak institutions do not share the
burden of distress well.4
1.3 Contractual Adaptation
If the country’s underlying basic and narrow institutions do not per-
mit a contingent, speedy, and predictable sharing of adverse eco-
nomic circumstances, and the tendency of the government is to
spread the burden along the path of least resistance, economic agents
will take steps to protect themselves. But without a reliable and ef-
fective legal system, what can they do? Clearly, the answer is to use
instruments that depend in a very limited way on the legal system
for enforcement.
One approach is to use inﬂexible, noncontingent contracts, whose
violation is easily detected. For example, labor contracts in many
developing countries eﬀectively do not permit employees to be ﬁred.
This is seen as ineﬃcient because it does not allow ﬁrms to react
quickly to business conditions. Often, these prohibitions are ascribed
to overly strong unions that hold the economy to ransom. But if
courts are slow and corrupt, so that a worker who is wrongfully
ﬁred has no redress, perhaps the prohibition of ﬁring—because vio-
lations are so easily and publicly observable and can be responded
to through mass protests—is the only way to protect workers from
3We try to approximate the index created by Knack and Keefer (1995). The
ICRG measures for quality of bureaucracy, rule of law, corruption, and invest-
ment protection (including risk of expropriation, contract repudiation, and repa-
triation of proﬁts) are all normalized to be between zero and one. The index is
the weighted sum of these four measures, with the ﬁrst three having a weight of
0.2, and the last having a weight of 0.4.
4This contrasts with the view in Lane and Tornell (1998) where developing
countries do not share windfalls well and overspend them.
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arbitrary decisions by employers (also see Glaeser and Shleifer 2001).
Job tenure may also act as a form of social security because the gov-
ernment does a miserable job providing a safety net, and private
insurance markets do not exist. Thus an inﬂexible contract can pro-
tect workers when the preponderance of bargaining power is with
ﬁrms.
This is not to argue that such contractual arrangements should
never be reformed—they may outlive their initial usefulness if the
legal system improves, but may continue to be supported by vested
interests. The arguments we have made may be trotted out as a
defense long after they are valid.
1.3.1 Demandable Debt
Another form of a rigid contract, but one with special features, is
a bank demand deposit. Essentially, a demand deposit has two fea-
tures that make it virtually self-enforcing. First, the bank is required
to honor the claim when it is presented at the teller window. If it is
slow in doing so, or attempts in any way to renege, the news spreads
quickly since the refusal to honor a demand deposit is such a clear
and incontrovertible event. Second, the bank honors withdrawals in
the order they are presented until no more depositors want to with-
draw or the bank fails. “Sequential service” implies that when de-
positors sense even the slightest hint of potential distress, they have
a strong incentive to withdraw their money—if they do, at worst
they have the trouble of redepositing if the bank later turns out to
be safe; if they don’t, they may end up penniless as the bank fails.
The two features ensure that the ordinary depositor has a fairly
secure claim, supported by other depositors. The threat of a bank
run plays the same role as the threat of a labor strike—if bank man-
agement reneges on the commitment to repay the deposit contract,
it will face a depositor run, which will close it down. So except in the
case where it absolutely cannot pay, bank management will honor
deposit contracts (see Calomiris and Kahn [1991] and Diamond and
Rajan [2001]). This may be one reason why banks are such an im-
portant component of the ﬁnancial sector in emerging markets.
The broader point is that anticipating little power over outcomes
in downturns, weaker agents might demand contractual options that
will protect them in those states. For labor, it is the option to keep
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a job; for depositors, it is the option to get their money. For the
economy as a whole, however, the exercise of these options adds to
the diﬃculty of adjustment in downturns, exacerbating the problems
created by institutional weakness.
In the rest of the paper, we will examine these problems further,
speciﬁcally focusing on how demandable debt raises the risks of ﬁ-
nancing industry in emerging markets. But before we explore that,
let us add two more ingredients.
1.3.2 Domestic Liability Dollarization
Inﬂation is a greater systematic risk, in the ﬁnancial sense, in emerg-
ing markets. When it is likely to explode in downturns there, depos-
itors will demand an extraordinarily high risk premium for holding
inﬂation risk. Issuers who want to minimize expected debt service—
perhaps because of short horizons, or because they are liquidity
constrained—will opt to issue real instruments (see Caballero and
Krishnamurthy [2003] for a related explanation, and Ize and Levy-
Yeyati [2003] and Jeanne [2005] for other theories of why inﬂation
risk could lead to dollarization).
If there is high volatility in inﬂation (which usually accompanies a
high inﬂation rate) in addition to weak institutions, inﬂation-indexed
instruments may not be attractive to the public. Uncertainty about
the measurement of inﬂation, delays in producing an accurate esti-
mate, and fears that the measurement will be manipulated can in-
crease their risks. The natural alternative to issuing inﬂation-indexed
bonds is to denominate them in a foreign currency. This way, suspi-
cion about the oﬃcial actions in a downturn may lead quite naturally
to domestic liability dollarization.
1.3.3 Evidence on Liability Dollarization
What evidence do we have for this conjecture? Nicolo, Honohan,
and Ize (2003) ﬁnd that in a cross-section of countries, the extent
of dollarization (dollar deposits to total deposits) is positively and
signiﬁcantly correlated with the log of inﬂation. However, when a
proxy for institutional quality is included, inﬂation no longer en-
ters signiﬁcantly. The evidence is consistent with weak institutions
driving inﬂation, which in turn leads to greater dollarization.
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Again, however, we want to test a more nuanced version. We
also want to see if there is a relationship between the sensitivity
of inﬂation tax to growth (which, we have seen, appears to reﬂect
the ability of a country to allocate the costs of economic adversity)
and the level of dollarization. We also want to see if the extent of
dollarization is related to the volatility of inﬂation, over and above its
correlation with the level of inﬂation. In table 3, we present summary
statistics and cross-correlations. The extent of liability dollarization
is measured by the ratio of foreign currency deposits to total deposits
(FCDTD) in a country’s banking system averaged over the 1990s,
using the Nicolo, Honohan, and Ize (2003) data. The sensitivity of
inﬂation tax to growth for a country (henceforth “sensitivity”) is the
coeﬃcient estimate on GDP growth in a regression of the inﬂation
tax on GDP growth for that country for the period 1965–2002. The
standard deviation of inﬂation tax is measured for every period t by
its standard deviation during the ﬁve years from t− 4 to t; then for
the cross-section, we take the average of standard deviation over the
period 1965–2002.
In table 4, the dependent variable is liability dollarization in a
country in the 1990s. In column 1 we include the sensitivity of in-
ﬂation tax to GDP growth and a constant as explanatory variables.
The coeﬃcient estimate for the sensitivity is negative and signiﬁ-
cant. Since the sensitivity is typically negative (lower growth, more
inﬂation tax), countries with a higher magnitude of the sensitivity
have greater deposit dollarization, as expected. In ﬁgure 2 (shown on
page 194), we plot the extent of dollarization against sensitivity. As
the graph suggests, the relationship is likely to be nonlinear. So in
column 2, we allow for a nonlinear speciﬁcation of sensitivity by in-
cluding the square of sensitivity. The coeﬃcient of the squared term
is positive and strongly signiﬁcant. Greater sensitivity again is cor-
related with greater dollarization. If sensitivity changes from 0 to its
lower 1 percentile threshold (–0.029), dollarization increases by 33
percent, which is 140 percent of its standard deviation.
We check that this relationship persists even when we include the
“usual suspects.” In column 3, we include the average inﬂation tax
in the country, and in column 4 we add the standard deviation of the
inﬂation tax. While the coeﬃcients for the nonlinear speciﬁcation for
sensitivity are positive and statistically signiﬁcant in both columns,
the coeﬃcient for inﬂation tax is positive and signiﬁcant only when
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included alone, but becomes insigniﬁcant when the standard devi-
ation of inﬂation tax is included. The estimates for sensitivity are
qualitatively similar if we include squared terms for inﬂation tax and
the standard deviation of inﬂation tax (estimates not reported). Fi-
nally, in column 5, we include both the log of per capita GDP and
the index of legal restrictions on dollarization compiled by Nicolo,
Honohan, and Ize (2003), which is available for only eighty-three of
the countries, and ﬁnd qualitatively similar results.
One should not read too much into these last few “kitchen sink”
regressions since sensitivity, inﬂation tax, and the standard deviation
of the inﬂation tax measure various aspects of the same thing. All
we want to show the reader is that both sensitivity and the standard
deviation of inﬂation tax seem to be correlated with the extent of
dollarization as predicted by the earlier discussion, and seem to cap-
ture something more than just the level of the inﬂation tax, which
the prior literature has identiﬁed.
The evidence thus far is consistent with the following conclusions:
countries with weak institutions have greater sensitivity of inﬂation
to growth. In countries with higher sensitivity, investors have a higher
demand for real deposits. Because inﬂation is also very volatile, they
may prefer deposits denominated in foreign exchange rather than
deposits that are indexed.5
1.4 Aggregate Dollar Constraints/Sudden Stops
Let us now add the ﬁnal ingredient to the model. Since emerging
markets with the weakest institutions for conﬂict management (and
the most divided societies) have the hardest time spreading the bur-
dens of distress, they are also likely to have the most diﬃculty rais-
ing resources to continue to service external debt. The tendency of
some countries to default repeatedly (Reinhart, Rogoﬀ, and Savas-
tano 2003) may reﬂect the weakness of their capacity to manage
5There is a sense in which this argument runs counter to the “Original Sin”
thesis (for example, see Eichengreen and Hausmann [2005] and Eichengreen,
Hausmann, and Panizza [2005a, 2005b]) because we attribute ﬁnancial fragilities
to weak institutions rather than to other factors like country size. But Eichen-
green and Hausmann (2005) and Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2005a,
2005b) focus on the currency denomination of public debt rather than on the
currency denomination of bank debt. For yet another view of institutional expla-
nations of ﬁnancial system fragilities, see Mody (2004).
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economic adversity rather than any inherent lack of honesty on the
part of their governments. But this means that these countries are
likely to face aggregate constraints on external borrowing sooner
than other countries. Since in periods of adversity creditors will re-
duce their expectations of what the country will be able to repay,
they will also reduce what they are willing to lend. Such a “verti-
cal” constraint on dollars the country can borrow (as in Caballero
and Krishnamurthy [2000, 2004], or as a sudden stop in Calvo and
Reinhart [2002]), will interact with liability dollarization to produce
unfortunate consequences, which we now document.
2. Consequences: Overshooting, Liquidation, and
Contagion
Now that we have the ingredients, dollarized bank deposits and the
possibility of aggregate constraints on borrowing, let us sketch the
consequences.
2.1 The Sources of Dollar Shortage
In the normal course, dollar depositors will want to withdraw some of
their deposits. The reasons for this can range from normal liquidity
needs (such as importing foreign goods) to good dollar investment
opportunities outside the country. Clearly, if their bank has fewer
dollar reserves than the amount of withdrawals, it will buy dollars
on the market. Summing across banks, there will be an aggregate
demand for dollars, which will have to be met out of the country’s
reserves, dollar repatriation by exporters, and, if necessary, addi-
tional external borrowing. It does not really matter which domestic
entity (government or banks) does the external borrowing since the
aggregate available pool of dollar resources will determine whether
the aggregate domestic demand can be satisﬁed.
Problems arise when the aggregate demand exceeds the aggre-
gate supply (not including external borrowing) and the country has
diﬃculty borrowing the shortfall. One such situation is one where
the economy is booming but the (ﬁxed) exchange rate is overval-
ued. Exporters may not earn enough and, far from bringing foreign
exchange into the country to repay loans, they may seek to draw
down their deposits to continue operations. Importers may have a
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huge demand for dollars because foreign goods appear cheap. When
added to the normal liquidity needs of depositors, the demand may
be so high that it even exceeds the willingness of foreign investors to
lend the shortfall. Another situation arises when the excess demand
is relatively small but the economy is in a bad way, or the govern-
ment has overborrowed, so foreign investors are unwilling even to
lend meager amounts of extra dollars needed. In fact, the govern-
ment can contribute to the private sector dollar shortage by adding
its own external ﬁnancing needs.
Regardless of how the dollar shortage emerges (and we will
shortly see some examples), the dollarized banking system can exac-
erbate it (see Diamond and Rajan [2005] for a detailed model). Since
the banks have issued a nonrenegotiable promise to pay dollars, they
either have to convince their own depositors not to withdraw, by hik-
ing the interest rates paid on dollar deposits, or they have to attract
dollars away from other banks in the spot market. Higher rates may
quell some depositor demand, but a core liquidity demand that can-
not be deterred with higher rates will remain. If this still exceeds the
available dollars, the banks will compete with each other for scarce
dollars. Given that a bank fails if it does not come up with the needed
dollars, it will be willing to pay what it must for additional dollars.
With an overall shortage in place, however, banks can competitively
drive each other into failure.
Short banks will sell nondollar spot assets and long-term assets
for dollars. Thus the exchange rate (dollars per domestic currency)
will tend to fall and interest rates (both for long-term dollar assets
and for long-term domestic currency assets) will rise. In principle,
because the quantity of dollar demand and supply cannot adjust
readily, these prices can move very far from any notion of funda-
mental value. Both the exchange rate and the interest rate can over-
shoot during the scramble for dollar liquidity. Real decisions will be
aﬀected during this scramble, with lasting consequences. Let us go
systematically through them.
2.2 Real Consequences
The ﬁrst place banks will look for additional dollars is among those
who generate additional dollars and those who use them. Exporters
will be squeezed in an attempt to get them to speed up their owndollar
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receipts and hasten repayment of dollar borrowings to banks (on
average, across emerging markets, approximately 30 percent of do-
mestic loans made by banks are denominated in foreign currency). To
raise these amounts quickly, exporters will sell ﬁnished goods inven-
tories at steep discounts and reduce near-term sales prices. They will
shelve exports that are highly import intensive and abandon long-
term projects, especially those that require capital goods imports.
Clearly, all these actions will impair the economy’s medium-run
ability to export and thus its ability to generate dollars in the future.
The weaker a country’s institutions, the greater will be the discount
banks place on a future dollar generated by an exporter relative to
a current dollar (foreign investors will be willing to lend less against
the future), and the greater the long-run destructive consequences
of a scramble for dollars.
We will see these eﬀects not only in the tradable sector, but also
in the nontradable sector. As domestic interest rates rise (because
long-run domestic assets are being sold for dollars), more and more
domestic projects will be shelved as they have to meet an impossible
hurdle rate.
As bank assets fall in value, some banks—typically the ones with
the greatest asset liability currency mismatch (though see later)—
will become insolvent. This will trigger a generalized run on the
banks’ assets, causing even those who had no desire to withdraw to
add to dollar demand.6 The horizon of failing banks will be even
shorter, causing them to be even more indiscriminate in the squeeze
they put on borrowers. Even projects that could produce substantial
dollar revenues in the near term may be sacriﬁced for the immediate
need—for example, banks may stop oﬀering working capital loans
and export credit even if these are essential for the exporter to gen-
erate revenues. As a result, the aggregate pool of dollars available
over the near term could fall as banks fail, and the aggregate excess
demand for dollars could increase, putting pressure on other banks.7
This form of contagion could imperil the entire banking system.
6Note that if the exchange rate is ﬁxed but there are no capital controls,
domestic currency depositors have an even greater incentive to withdraw (and
convert) than dollar depositors because they will fear a devaluation.
7Clearly, a bank that fails will refuse to honor some of its dollar depositors. The
unsatisﬁed demand of these depositors will reduce aggregate demand. Therefore,
the eﬀect of bank failure on the excess demand for dollars depends on whether
supply falls faster or slower than demand. See Diamond and Rajan (2005) for
conditions under which each is true.
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To summarize, when bank depositors demand repayment in dol-
lars but the economy cannot generate enough dollars to satisfy them,
the consequences can be very serious. Domestic dollar interest rates
will rise to draw in dollars and choke oﬀ depositor demands. If, how-
ever, there is a core group of depositors who absolutely want to
withdraw dollars, and a limit to which outsiders are willing to lend
to the country, the country’s banking system can face an excess de-
mand for dollars that it cannot meet. If so, other asset prices will
fall precipitously as banks scramble to capture enough dollars from
the common pool to save themselves. Domestic currency interest
rates will spike up, while the exchange rate will plummet. Banks
will squeeze borrowers, and aggregate activity will fall. Some banks
may become insolvent and such failures could be contagious.
Of course, in any such model, we could get multiple equilibria,
where outside lenders impose a sudden stop, which leads to the dol-
lar shortage, which leads to bank actions that reduce future dollar
receipts, which justify the stop. We do not need, however, to appeal
to multiple equilibria to explain the crisis—a spike upward in dol-
lar demand or downward in dollar supply, coupled with a “normal”
demand for liquidity, is suﬃcient to produce the eﬀects.
2.3 Related Literature
Consider now how this model diﬀers from earlier work. In a com-
prehensive survey, Frankel and Wei (2004) attempt to distinguish
between the three “generations” of crisis models on the basis on
their explanation of why the crisis occurs:
“Whose fault is the crisis? Generation I says domestic
macroeconomic policy, Generation II says volatile ﬁnan-
cial markets, and Generation III says ﬁnancial structure.
In neutral language, the explanations are, respectively,
excessive macroeconomic expansion, ‘multiple equilibria,’
and moral hazard. In ﬁnger-pointing language, the
respective culprits are undisciplined domestic policy-
makers, crazy international investors, and crony
capitalists.”
The model in this paper is related to the third-generation mod-
els in that it focuses on structural problems associated with lending
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to emerging-market countries. However, in our paper, crises are not
necessarily caused by willful misbehavior. Instead, they stem from
adverse liquidity shocks that jolt a system that is necessarily rigid,
given the institutional inadequacies of the economy. Put another way,
better regulation and supervision may not necessarily eliminate the
possibility of a crisis. What is really needed is deep-rooted institu-
tional reform: susceptibility to crises in our framework ultimately
rests not in an incentive problem but a collective action problem.
A closely related paper is that of Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia
(2004), who also focus on a link between sudden stops, dollar-
ization, and banking crises. In their paper, sudden stops lead
to a devaluation—in order to maintain external balance—which
then causes problems in the dollarized banking system through
liability mismatches. In other words, macrocauses have micro-
consequences. In our model, the channel is not the need to
maintain external balance but, rather, bank liquidity. The sud-
den stop creates a dollar shortage, which leads banks to dump
assets, causing the exchange rate (and interest rates) to over-
shoot fundamentals, which then create balance sheet problems for
the banking system. Microcauses aggregate up to have macro-
consequences.
While we think both explanations have merit, there are diﬀer-
ences. For instance, to the extent that a devaluation gives exporters
the ability to earn more (expansionary devaluation), there is no rea-
son for it to hurt the solvency of a dollarized banking system—since
banks typically make dollar loans to the exporters (see Nicola, Hono-
han, and Ize 2003). But to the extent that the capacity to earn future
dollars does not translate into current dollars, a liquidity mismatch
could persist, and banks could still go under in our framework.
2.4 Some Examples
Consider some examples.
2.4.1 Argentina (2001)
By the end of 2000, the Argentinean banking system had ap-
proximately $72 billion in foreign-currency-denominated assets and
about the same amount in liabilities. By most standards, it seemed
to have matched exposures. However, $25 billion of its assets
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were government securities, issued by a government that was
increasingly strapped for ﬁnancing. Another $41 billion were
foreign-currency-denominated loans and securities issued by Argen-
tinean corporations, which clearly did not have the ability to repay
quickly, as exports amounted to only $31 billion. Of the liabilities,
$48.5 billion were foreign currency deposits.
In this fragile situation, depositor runs could start for two related
reasons. First, if the government could not draw in more external
resources to meet its own external debt service needs, or its new
borrowing requirements, the anticipated available dollar pool would
be severely constrained. The banking system’s liquidity needs would
compete with the government’s needs, pushing up interest rates and
leading, perhaps, to a devaluation.8 Second, given the extensive bank
holdings of government assets, a government default could render
banks insolvent (though see below).
Depositor runs started in 2001. Bank liabilities fell by $24 bil-
lion (approximately 9 percent of GDP). In fact, Argentina lost more
as a result of the bank run than as a result of the inability of the
government to access external markets to meet ﬁnancing needs. In-
terestingly, the fall in domestic-currency-denominated deposits was
far greater than the fall in foreign currency deposits, suggesting that
depositors feared a devaluation, perhaps from the liquidity shortage,
more than a bank default. Since bank holdings of government debt
could not be reduced—in fact, they increased—the run was ﬁnanced
by curtailing private lending ($12 billion), running down bank liquid
assets ($5 billion), and borrowing from the central bank ($9 billion).
Ultimately, the entire banking system was aﬀected, deposits were
frozen, then loans and deposits were “pesiﬁed” at diﬀerent rates.
The consequences are still being dealt with. The point to take away
is that a government may aﬀect the dollarized domestic banking
system simply by crowding out access to dollars.
8This would not necessarily lead to a default by dollar borrowers. For in-
stance, Bleakley and Cowan (2002) ﬁnd that the negative balance sheet eﬀects
of devaluation are outweighed by the competitiveness gains for a sample of Latin
American ﬁrms.
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2.4.2 Uruguay (2002)
Uruguay experienced an almost reverse sequence of events: liquidity
problems in the banking sector triggered a crisis, a devaluation, and
problems for the government, which then had to restructure debt.
Let us examine how this happened.
Uruguay also had a highly dollarized banking system. Bank de-
posits were about 90 percent of GDP by the end of 2001; 90 percent
of these deposits were denominated in U.S. dollars. About half these
deposits were held by nonresidents, mostly Argentineans.
As the Argentineans saw their deposits in Argentina frozen, they
started withdrawing from Uruguayan banks. Their liquidity need
could have been met by Uruguay’s domestic holdings of liquid for-
eign currency assets. However, anticipating a shortage, Uruguayan
residents also began withdrawing deposits. With over 45 percent of
the foreign currency deposits withdrawn, the currency depreciated
precipitously, prompting further concerns about bank solvency. The
government declared a bank holiday to stop the run; eventually, it
successfully reopened the banking system with the help of a standby
arrangement from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a
rescheduling of deposits.
As a result of the depreciation, public debt, which was largely
denominated in foreign currency, ballooned from about 45 percent
of GDP by the end of 2001, to 100 percent of GDP by the end of
2002. Eventually, it had to be restructured. In this case, liquidity
problems in the banking sector created problems for the government
in servicing its public debt.
2.4.3 South Korea (1997–98)
It is generally accepted that the trigger for the Korean ﬁnancial cri-
sis was a decline in export growth, especially in key areas like semi-
conductors. The weakening demand in importing partners and the
appreciation of the real exchange rate as the dollar—to which many
Asian currencies were implicitly pegged—strengthened against the
yen, were behind the pressure on the real external sector. In the case
of Korea, such initial pressure, emanating in the real external sector,
was compounded by a banking system that had issued a signiﬁcant
amount of short-term external debt and thus was vulnerable to a
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liquidity shock. Contrast this with the liquidity shock that resulted
from the government’s losing access to external borrowing, in the
case of Argentina, or the liquidity shock set in motion by Argen-
tineans withdrawing their deposits abroad, in the case of Uruguay.
We will not describe the details of the crisis, which resembled in
many ways what we have described above (see Ghosh et al. [2002,
210] and Lindgren et al. [1999, 188] for details). Korean banks ini-
tially started facing diﬃculties in mid-1997. The government an-
nounced a guarantee of foreign borrowings by Korean banks, and the
central bank attempted to help foreign branches and subsidiaries of
Korean banks roll over their foreign currency borrowings. But this
depleted reserves, leaving the central bank with little to ﬁght do-
mestic bank runs. The government simply did not have the neces-
sary dollars to back the guarantee it had announced. The won fell
sharply.
In early December, the IMF announced a standby arrangement
with Korea equivalent to $21 billion, with additional ﬁnancing from
others of $37 billion. Yet this massive package was insuﬃcient, and
the won continued falling. It was only when foreign private banks
agreed to maintain their exposure to Korean banks by exchanging
their interbank loans for short-term government-guaranteed bonds,
and when the IMF accelerated disbursement of the loan, that pres-
sure on the won abated. In terms of our framework, the shortage was
eliminated by reducing dollar demand and increasing dollar supply
and thus alleviating pressure on both the exchange rate and the in-
terest rate.
Interestingly, in the case of Korea, a liquidity crisis was averted
because the government had spare borrowing capacity and could
draw in dollars (with some help from the IFIs and developed coun-
try governments), which it then lent out to the banks. With a few
examples behind us, we can now discuss policy interventions in gen-
eral terms.
3. Interventions
Let us recapitulate what happens if no intervention takes place. Ob-
viously, the only way to eliminate a dollar shortage is to increase
supply or reduce demand for dollars. If dollar depositors who seek
to withdraw are not tempted to stay in the bank by higher dollar
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interest rates (for the same reason, perhaps, that higher interest rates
do not draw fresh foreign investors in), then banks will start com-
peting for scarce dollars. Since a bank has to satisfy every one of its
withdrawing dollar depositors in order to stay in business, it will be
willing to pay any feasible price for dollars if it is falling short. This is
why prices of nondollar assets can deviate so far from fundamentals—
the bank essentially faces a classic short squeeze where it has to de-
liver a speciﬁc asset in short supply, so it is willing to sell all other
assets, almost regardless of price.
The dollar shortage is a form of liquidity shortage for the bank-
ing system. However, it can aﬀect the solvency of ﬁrms, banks, and
even the government, so it is extremely diﬃcult to tell it apart from
a solvency problem. There are many ways solvency and liquidity can
interact. Consider two. First, the dollar shortage may stem from an
insolvent government not being able to roll over dollar liabilities (a
sudden stop). Too few dollars relative to demand can cause banks to
dump domestic assets, pushing up interest rates and depressing the
exchange rate, thus rendering ﬁrms with dollar liabilities insolvent.
Second, some banks may be insolvent because of bad loans. A run on
them may cause a squeeze on credit to exporters, a shortage of dol-
lars, and contagion in the banking system, rendering the government
insolvent through its contingent liabilities to the banking system.
Put another way, the practical challenge in the midst of a crisis
is to make a judgment call on whether the crisis is one of illiquidity.
If the judgment is in the aﬃrmative, the proper intervention is to
lend freely to the healthiest banks the commodity that is in short
supply, in this case dollars (or alternatively, convince dollar demand-
ers to hold oﬀ pressing their claims). For, if the crisis is truly one of
illiquidity, prevailing market rates will fall, and weaker institutions
will regain market access rapidly. If the crisis is one of insolvency,
market rates will stay high, and the banking system will continue
to be fragile. Thus, except when failures are isolated or when as-
set values collapse for other reasons than high interest rates or low
exchange rates, it is typically only after intervening in a crisis and
seeing the consequences that one can tell whether the crisis was one
of illiquidity or insolvency.
Given the diﬃculty of telling illiquidity from insolvency, and
given the cost of a banking system meltdown, if the government
has dollar reserves, spare external borrowing capacity, or support
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from international ﬁnancial institutions, it would sell dollars into
the banking system hoping to alleviate pressure. However, we have
deﬁned a dollar shortage as one where the government itself has too
few resources to contribute. So let us turn to other interventions.
3.1 Ex-post Intervention by Country Authorities
3.1.1 Recapitalization
The authorities can recapitalize speciﬁc banks by oﬀering them ad-
ditional domestic assets or guarantees (backed by domestic assets).
Often, what is termed “liquidity support” are simply loans by the
central bank to distressed banks without adequate collateral backing
the loans—in short, they are partial recapitalizations.
While targeted recapitalizations can prevent speciﬁc banks from
failing, they leave, on the aggregate, a dollar gap that has to be
closed somehow. Unless other banks are allowed to fail, the aggre-
gate dollar demand cannot be satisﬁed. This implies that a bank
recapitalization without any attempt to bridge the dollar gap only
forces other, potentially healthier, banks to fail. A blanket recapital-
ization or guarantee of all banks simply allows all banks to bid more
for dollars (that is, it increases the interest or exchange overshoot-
ing) without reducing the eventual extent of bank failures. This is
why it is best to close down some banks and thus resolve the dollar
shortage before oﬀering indiscriminate guarantees.
3.1.2 Monetary Policy
The monetary authorities could be accommodative and buy long-
term domestic assets in exchange for domestic reserves (or do the
opposite). Monetary accommodation will reduce the extent to which
the burden of adjustment falls on the interest rate, and increase the
downward pressure on the exchange rate. If not reversed later, it will
increase inﬂationary pressures.
However, the proximate eﬀect will be to shift the burden among
banks—the survival chances of banks with relatively more holdings
of long-term domestic assets will improve, while the chances of those
with more net dollar liabilities will weaken. Whether the new pattern
of failure reduces the overall dollar shortage depends on whether the
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newly failing banks subtract more dollar liquidity in failing than the
banks that would fail absent the intervention.
An exchange rate defense (keeping the exchange rate high by
tightening monetary policy) and an interest rate defense (keeping the
interest rate low by being accommodative) are diﬀerent in this simple
framework only in that they select diﬀerent sets of banks for failure.
The choice between them rests on which one allows the banking
system to come through the dollar shortage creating the minimum
long-term damage to the real economy—through the damage the
failing banks and their clients sustain. We are, of course, abstracting
from any issues of credibility here, though it would be hard to unam-
biguously relate monetary authority credibility gains to a particular
form of defense.
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2004) also examine monetary pol-
icy in a situation of a dollar shortage. However, while our focus is on
the eﬀects of monetary policy on the extent of failure and economic
damage (an ex-post analysis), their focus is on the ex-ante eﬀects on
the incentive to hold dollars. An accommodative monetary policy is
unambiguously preferred in their analysis because it increases agent
incentives to hold dollars before the crisis. Since the main friction
in their model is that the price of dollars is too low ex-post (agents
who need them do not have the collateral to buy them), any policy
that enhances the price of dollars during the crisis enhances ex-ante
incentives.
If, however, such a policy did considerable damage to the banking
system (because, for example, moderately illiquid banks had many
dollar liabilities), an eﬀect they abstract from, our analysis suggests
the policy would be dominated. In fact, such a preannounced policy
might have limited credibility ex-ante and thus limited incentive ef-
fects. On the other hand, unlike their paper, we assume no frictions
in trading dollars ex-post, so we abstract from the eﬀects they focus
on. The two papers should therefore be seen as complementary.
Before proceeding to other interventions, we should note that
the monetary authority also has the ability to select banks that will
fail by allocating its limited foreign exchange reserves only to some
banks (i.e., at a subsidized price) and not to others. While such an
intervention is fraught with political diﬃculties (who will be chosen
and will the process be transparent), ultimately, it is an optimization
problem where regulators allocate scarce resources to minimize the
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overall cost of bank failures. Thus it is similar in consequence to the
interventions just discussed.
3.1.3 Forced Conversion/Suspension of Convertibility/Capital
Controls
Finally, consider even stronger interventions that violate the rights
of the depositors. These include forced conversion into domestic cur-
rency at a predetermined (typically below market) rate, the freezing
of foreign currency deposits, and the imposition of capital controls.
Clearly, such interventions can be implemented only by the country
authorities and not by the banks alone.
While these interventions do solve, to diﬀering extents, the prob-
lem of dollar shortage, they do so at the expense of a substantial
loss in future credibility. Moreover, it is not clear that they can be
implemented eﬀectively and for the long term. For instance, capital
controls tend to leak, and the longer they are in place, the more
they leak. Therefore, the authorities had better be conﬁdent that
the liquidity shortage is temporary, or else the breathing space these
measures give them will be insuﬃcient to rectify the problem; the
problem will return with a vengeance with the added diﬃculty that
the authorities then have no credibility.
3.2 Ex-ante Intervention by Country Authorities
Thus far we have discussed measures that could be taken in the midst
of a crisis. Consider now measures that could be taken up front by
the economy.
3.2.1 Reserves
One way to bullet-proof an economy against dollar shortages is for
the authorities to build foreign reserves. Of course, there are costs to
holding reserves and to building them, including the ﬁscal costs and
possible distortions in the exchange rate. Furthermore, it is possible
that the level of dollarization in the economy increases as reserves,
and conﬁdence, grow. As a result, the authorities may lose all control
over monetary policy and the transmission mechanism. Building a
moderate amount of reserves is clearly warranted, but the welfare
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eﬀects of building a hoard large enough to buﬀer against most crises
are ambiguous.
A second question that arises with reserves is whether the coun-
try should use them to prepay debt. In other words, is spare debt
capacity not the same as holding reserves, and less costly to boot?
For the riskiest countries, though, prepaying debt may be dominated
by holding reserves: spare debt capacity is less fungible than reserves,
and may also disappear in a crisis. Also, by prepaying debt, the coun-
try loses the option to force a restructuring, which may be valuable
in times of stress.
3.2.2 De-dollarization and Shifting Dollarization
Given the risks associated with dollar shortages, some countries, in-
cluding Mexico and Bolivia in 1982 and Peru in 1985, have opted to
ban dollarization. But if the proximate cause, monetary instability,
is not eliminated, investors will demand signiﬁcantly higher interest
rates to hold domestic currency deposits, and some may simply take
the money out of the country. Consistent with this, countries that
today have signiﬁcant restrictions on dollarization—such as Brazil,
Colombia, and Venezuela—have particularly high loan spreads (see
Inter-American Development Bank 2005).
Also, domestic currency depositors are not passive. With less-
than-eﬀective monetary authorities, banks could be subject to stress
even if they only issue domestic deposits. For instance, suppose the
authorities maintain an overvalued but ﬁxed exchange rate. Fear-
ing an eventual return to equilibrium, depositors have an incentive
to withdraw and convert into foreign currency. This puts enormous
stress on the banking system, forcing it to pay high interest rates to
keep depositors in, with the level of interest rates being determined
by the degree of overvaluation rather than more typical determinants
like the return on investment and expected inﬂation. As described
earlier, domestic currency depositors were prominent in the Argen-
tinean bank runs in 2001.
The point is that dollarization is not necessarily an aberration
in the environment that gives birth to it. Instead, it may be a rea-
sonable adaptation. As Savastano (1996) and Balin˜o, Bennet, and
Borensztein (1999) document, the consequence of banning dollariza-
tion in Mexico, Bolivia, and Peru was typically a severe contraction
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of intermediation that was reversed in Bolivia and Peru only when
dollar deposits were allowed again. Similarly, Nicolo, Honohan, and
Ize (2003) show that economies with high inﬂation tend to have more
monetary depth with dollarization than without.
Rather than banning liability dollarization altogether, authorities
may want to focus on removing the distortions that lead it to its
excessive practice, such as the dollar-liability issuers not internalizing
all the risks. More useful, of course, is to focus on changing the
underlying conditions that lead to dollarization in the ﬁrst place, a
point we will touch on shortly.
Before concluding this section, note two points. First, the tran-
sition from an economy with liability dollarization to one where dol-
larization is banned implies either violating existing dollar contracts
and prohibiting new ones, or shifting dollar liabilities to another
domestic entity. The Brazilian government essentially took the lat-
ter route by taking on the dollar liabilities of its banking system—
through the issuance of dollar-denominated bonds to banks in 1998.
As a result, even though the Brazilian real depreciated substantially
in 1998–99, the banks were relatively immunized. Of course, govern-
ment debt ballooned as a result.
From a theoretical perspective, the government could improve
welfare by taking on the dollar liabilities of the banking sector. When
individual banks fail during a dollar shortage, we have seen that
they can worsen the aggregate shortage. When the government takes
over the liabilities of the banking sector, these individual failures are
eliminated, so the dollar shortage need not be as severe. Against
this, one should weigh the increased moral hazard if the government
is expected to step in every time banks anticipate trouble.
Second, as argued above, with a ﬁxed exchange rate and full
convertibility, even domestic-currency-denominated liabilities may
become a source of vulnerability. This suggests that the choice of
exchange regime is not without consequence (also see, for example,
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo [2001b] or Edwards [2004]). But
unfortunately, the very institutional requirements needed to main-
tain a monetary anchor with a ﬂoating exchange rate regime may be
missing in countries where ﬁxed exchange regimes create vulnerabili-
ties. Therefore, there are trade-oﬀs involved in the choice of exchange
regime, and as suggested by Calvo and Mishkin (2003), it may be
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more useful to focus on changing the underlying institutions rather
than on choosing a speciﬁc regime.
3.2.3 Institutional Reform
The root cause of deposit dollarization, we have argued, is weak ba-
sic institutions for conﬂict management. The more proximate causes
are inadequate ﬁscal and monetary institutions. Of course, it is
easier—though not easy—to reform the narrow institutions rather
than the basic ones. But without reforming the deeper basic insti-
tutions, which typically requires deep-rooted political change, how
successful can reform of narrow institutions be? We do not know
much about the process of institutional reform; countries like Chile,
Mexico, and South Korea that have improved their basic institu-
tions over a relatively short time, aided by good policies and rapid
economic growth, oﬀer only a few successful examples. Understand-
ing what ingredients in this mix are essential, and what simply are
coincidental, is a topic of ongoing research on which, hopefully, re-
searchers will have more to say in the near future. For now, let us
turn to the role the international ﬁnancial institutions can play.
3.3 What Can IFIs Do?
Clearly, the international ﬁnancial institutions (IFIs) can provide
the technical support that will help countries adopt good policies
and improve their narrow institutions (such as their ﬁscal frame-
work or their inﬂation-targeting framework). They can also provide
the bilateral and multilateral economic surveillance that can alert
countries to possible sources of shocks. The International Monetary
Fund does all this. The million-dollar question, of course, is whether
IFIs should lend in such situations.
3.3.1 “Liquidity” Loans
A dollar shortage seems precisely the kind of temporary need that
certain IFIs like the International Monetary Fund were set up to
meet. By creating a common reserve pool of dollars, the IFIs can
substitute for costly reserve hoarding by countries.
The most persuasive case for lending is when the IFI alleviates
what is essentially a market-driven short squeeze on the country. It
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tides the country over its temporary exchange shortage, preventing
more destructive domestic sector real adjustment, and gets repaid
once the reasons for the temporary need vanish (e.g., exports re-
cover).
The diﬃculty, of course, even with this simple scenario, is that the
ultimate cause for a dollar shortage has to be that the country loses
access to international markets. Thus the IFI has to make the judg-
ment call of whether the loss of access is due to irrational/rational
uncoordinated behavior by market participants, or whether it stems
from genuine fears. If the former is the case, most would agree that
the IFI should act as a lender of last resort. The only remaining
concern would be whether this role creates bad incentives for market
participants, for the government, and for banks—the issue of moral
hazard, to which we will come in a moment.
If, however, the adverse shock precipitating the dollar shortage
reﬂects a genuine institutional inﬁrmity in the country—for instance,
that the government has no ﬁscal discipline, it has reached borrowing
limits, and thus it is shut oﬀ from international capital markets—
matters become more diﬃcult. It may well be that the country could
undertake reforms that would help it regain access. In this case, the
country is illiquid but solvent contingent on undertaking reforms.
Solvency, however, will not be restored until the markets gain conﬁ-
dence that the reforms are irreversible. This implies that the lending
may well not be temporary.
If the alternative is a banking system crisis coupled with a burden
to restructure public debt, both of which will set back the country’s
economy considerably, it may well make sense to lend even when
reforms are highly probable but not fully assured. The IFI bears
some risk here that it will not be repaid, but it does so in the larger
interest of the member country facing distress (and it should impose
conditionality as well as charge an adequate premium for the risk).
The problem critics have is with the assumption that the IFI has
a better ability to gauge willingness to reform than market partici-
pants. Two arguments have been put forward to justify this. First,
the IFI may have better information about the country. This may
have been true in the past, but given the development of ﬁnancial
markets, we see little reason to believe it to be true today. Second,
the IFI may have a better sense of its own ability (and willingness) to
coax the reform process forward, and may in fact have to show some
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success (or put its money at stake) before the market is persuaded.
The IFI may also be able to put in place incentives for the country
to reform. We ﬁnd the second argument more persuasive, but one
should not rule out the possibility that the IFI has an incentive to
ﬁnd a role for itself where none exists (see below).
A ﬁnal situation where IFI lending may be warranted is when the
country’s public debt is too high given its underlying fundamentals,
so it cannot borrow, but, as a result, it also faces an immediate dollar
shortage that threatens its banking system. Rather than stand back
and watch the banking system implode, the IFI may want to oﬀer a
bridge loan targeted at the banking system, to be repaid when the
country regains market access after restructuring its external public
debt. Again, this is a form of liquidity lending but one compounded
by the problem that the excessive public debt will prolong the even-
tual resolution.
All this, however, raises two questions. First, does IFI interven-
tion distort incentives among participants? Second, are there better
ways to provide assurance of liquidity support to member countries?
3.3.2 Incentive Distortion and Tough Love
At least three types of incentive distortions are possible: (1) an un-
willingness on the part of countries to take adequate precautions
or to avoid excessively risky situations, (2) an unwillingness on the
part of investors to take all risks into account, knowing they will
be “bailed out,” and (3) an unwillingness on the part of domestic
corporations and banks to insure themselves adequately.
Reams and reams have been written on the issue of moral hazard,
and we have little to add. Some argue that country moral hazard is
not an issue because ﬁnance ministers and central bank governors
lose their jobs in a ﬁnancial crisis. Others argue that investor moral
hazard is not a problem because investors lose their shirts in a cri-
sis. These arguments are reasonable but miss the point. No ﬁnance
minister will take an action that is certain to create a crisis. At the
margin, however, concerned about budget deﬁcits, a ﬁnance minister
may prefer to borrow cheaply in dollars than borrow more expen-
sively and for a longer term in domestic currency—especially if the
IFI is there to help if things go wrong. At the margin, interventions
do distort incentives to take risk.
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The question is, how much? Unfortunately, the empirical evi-
dence does not oﬀer a reasonable assessment of magnitudes (see
Jeanne and Zettelmeyer [2004] for an excellent exposition of the
issues). Our reading of the current consensus is that country and
investor moral hazard is small in most situations; in a few cases,
though, it could be really big. We need more research identifying the
circumstances where moral hazard is really a problem.
What seems clearer is that domestic corporations and banks may
have too little incentive to prepare themselves for possible shocks,
knowing that there are ways they can force the system to share that
risk with them. This, however, is a case for better domestic regulation
and supervision rather than limiting IFI intervention.
In sum, then, the moral hazard rationale against IFI intervention
may well exist in some cases, but we need to be able to identify
those cases better. If these cases are indeed few in number, as a
reasonable judgment would suggest, then it may well make sense to
accept the risks of inducing moral hazard through intervention while
trying harder to identify when it is a mistake.
If, however, the reasons for dollarization lie primarily in poor in-
stitutions rather than in gaming—a collective action problem rather
than an incentive problem—the greater concern should not be about
distorting individual incentives but about altering collective actions.
Sometimes external discipline forces a country to reform in ways,
and at a speed, that the domestic constellation of political forces
will simply not allow, if left to its own devices. Put another way,
bailouts may help governments shift the burden of a crisis oﬀ the
shoulders of the domestic business elite and onto domestic taxpayers
(see Jeanne and Zettelmeyer 2004). To the extent that the latter do
not have an adequate voice, they bear the brunt of excessive inter-
vention, and everyone else who has a voice is willing to go along.
The knowledge that bailouts may be hard to come by—a policy of
“tough love”—could pressure domestic forces to compromise and ef-
fect much-needed reform.
We simply do not understand the political economy of deep in-
stitutional reform, or of crisis, well enough to oﬀer a categorical an-
swer on whether external ﬁnancial support is a good thing or a bad
thing on net. Clearly, if there was an assurance that the pain would
be short and borne by those best able to absorb it, that the coun-
try would undertake genuine reforms, and that the future would be
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much brighter, “tough love” is certainly an argument worth consid-
ering. But what if the pain is prolonged, the economy degenerates
into warring factions, and much of the pain is borne by weaker sec-
tions of society? Again, further research is needed here. What seems
unquestionable is that if this route is chosen, there is a need to apply
steady external pressure long before a crisis, even conditioning the
extent of crisis assistance on past willingness to reform or maintain
good policies.
3.3.3 A Better Way to Intervene?
IFIs like the International Monetary Fund typically agree to lend
large amounts only when the member country is experiencing con-
ditions of distress. Since intervention, let alone adequate assistance,
is not assured, and the political considerations of large shareholders
as well as the economic situation of the member country can aﬀect
these decisions, countries face uncertainty—which reduces the eﬀec-
tiveness of intervention in warding oﬀ the crisis. Moreover, countries
fear that they will be forced to accept unwarranted conditionality
even if assistance is forthcoming, because they really have no alter-
natives in a moment of crisis. These are understandable concerns:
countries with a strong policy regime seem to want insurance, not
uncertain loans laden with further uncertainty about conditions.
There is a second problem with leaving assistance to the complete
discretion of the IFI. As we have argued, it is hard to tell, even in
the midst of a crisis, whether the underlying factors are temporary
or more structural, i.e., liquidity or solvency. The facts that emerge
are unlikely to help decision making. In such a case, discretion can
be harmful, as it exposes the IFI to internal and external political
pressures to intervene. Not only will the decision be biased as a
result of discretion, it will also be noisy, as it will not be based on
underlying fundamentals.
One way to change this is through rules. For instance, access
to IFI lending could be tied to a country’s policies and reforms in
normal times, as suggested by Jeanne and Zettelmeyer (2004). If a
country follows sound policies and undertakes needed reforms, there
should be a presumption that if and when it faces a crisis, it is likely
to be a liquidity crisis, or a solvency problem (such as a permanent
terms of trade shock) that is not of its own making. The IFI should
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intervene in the former, and will be providing insurance in the latter
case (with the country then making needed adjustments on its own
accord), not an entirely bad use of IFI resources.
These access limits could be set in the regular annual consul-
tations between the IFI and a member country, where they would
be based on an in-depth analysis of the country’s policies. To the
extent that a country’s policy environment changes signiﬁcantly, in-
terim assessments could also be undertaken. The assessments will
be a clear signal to the market about the IFI’s view of a country’s
policies, putting steady pressure outside normal IFI programs on the
country to stay the course of reforms (a “nonborrowing” program),
and putting more pressure on IFI staﬀ to do a good analysis because
inadequate assessments will be contested.
Two immediate concerns arise. First, if the IFI is to intervene
successfully in a liquidity crisis, it usually makes sense to pump in
enough funds to stop the panic. Smaller amounts may not do the job
and access limits, if set too low, may inhibit successful intervention.
While no one may be able to determine whether a crisis is one of
liquidity or solvency, IFI staﬀ can certainly judge how much is needed
from the facts of the crisis. So would not the rules on access be overly
constraining?
The answer, of course, is yes, but that is the point. To the extent
that the access limit is deemed insuﬃcient for the crisis at hand, the
IFI will have to convince bilateral or private parties to join, which
will limit excessive intervention. Otherwise, it will have to stay out.
Thus the access limit will eﬀectively translate into a probability of
intervention.
An alternative, though, is to link the probability of intervention,
but not the quantum of assistance, to the country’s policies and re-
forms in normal times. For instance, for countries in good standing,
a decision to help might need approval by only a minority of the
board, while for countries in poor standing, it might need approval
by a supermajority. A politically independent minority of the mem-
bers could then block loans to countries that have not shown much
ownership of reform policies in the past.
This then leads us to the second concern. Ex-ante conditionality,
which is eﬀectively what rules amount to, is more intrusive than any-
thing the IFIs currently do—even members not under programs will
be subject to greater scrutiny. Members will be rightly concerned
216 International Journal of Central Banking September 2005
about the kind of policies the IFI’s staﬀ will encourage and the
possibility of political interference in setting access limits (or voting
requirements). This implies that reforms to the governance of the
IFIs, ensuring that they are seen as legitimate by all the members,
will be critical to any such change in lending policies.
4. Conclusion
We examine liquidity or dollar shortages in dollarized economies
in this paper and explore how they precipitate and exacerbate cri-
sis. Unfortunately, the obvious solution—ban liability dollarization—
may not be appropriate. Liability dollarization is a response to insti-
tutional inﬁrmities. It will not diminish unless those inﬁrmities are
ﬁxed. In the meantime, we have to, as Guillermo Calvo suggested,
learn to “live with dollarization.”
In particular, this means stepped-up regulation and supervision
up front to ensure that dollarization does not become excessive. It
also implies that the government has the responsibility to maintain
a reasonable ﬁscal position so it does not crowd out liquidity, and
to maintain adequate reserves. It means developing tools for crisis
resolution that recognize the nature of the problem; a banking crisis
driven by a dollar shortage has to be dealt with in a diﬀerent way
from a banking crisis driven by bad loans. IFIs can play a role in all
this, but the precise way to circumscribe that role has to be worked
out.
Finally, we have to pay more attention to deep-rooted institu-
tional reform. Giving central banks more independence and adopting
inﬂation-targeting frameworks are good steps, but if not accompa-
nied by serious ﬁscal reform, they are unlikely to persuade the public
to forego dollarization.9 It may not be surprising that the level of
dollarization has increased over the 1990s despite a fall in inﬂation,
perhaps because monetary reforms still lack credibility. Fiscal reform
itself may be diﬃcult unless political reform creates better basic in-
stitutions for allocating burden sharing in the economy. This suggests
much work needs to be done.
9We agree in many ways with the analysis of Goldstein and Turner (2004),
who also focus on institutional reform as a way of dealing with dollarization.
However, we think it will be more diﬃcult than they seem to suggest.
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